We study a continuous-time R&D race between an established …rm and a startup under asymmetric information. R&D investment brings success stochastically but only if the innovation is feasible. The only asymmetry between the …rms is that the established …rm has better information about the feasibility of the innovation. We show that there is an equilibrium in which the poorly-informed startup wins more often, and has higher expected pro…ts, than the better-informed incumbent. When the informational asymmetry is large, this is the unique equilibrium outcome. Even though better information is a competitive disadvantage, the value of information is positive.
Introduction
Why Tesla and not GM or Toyota? Why Amazon and not Sears or Wal-Mart? Why are startups the source of so many innovations instead of, and at the expense of, established …rms? In his landmark history of the hard-disk industry over two decades, Christiansen (1997) found that the market for each new generation of disk drivestypically, smaller in size-was dominated by a di¤erent set of …rms. Of the 17 …rms in the industry in 1976, only IBM's disk-drive division survived until 1995. In the same period, there were 129 entrants but 109 of these failed to make the transition to later generations (Christiansen, 1997, p. 22) . Many technological innovations came from startups.
What advantage does a startup have over an established …rm? In one of his many classics, Arrow (1962) argued that because of the "monopolist's disincentive created by his preinvention pro…ts" (p. 622) an entrant would have more to gain from an innovation. This is sometimes called the "replacement e¤ect" because by successfully innovating, the monopolist would only be replacing himself while the entrant would be replacing the monopolist. 1 Running counter to Arrow's reasoning are the strong incentives that an incumbent has to protect its monopoly position. This stems from the Econ 101 m > 2d inequality-monopoly pro…ts exceed total pro…ts in a duopolywhich can be cleverly rearranged as m d > d. In this form, it says that the incentive of the incumbent to preserve its monopoly is greater than the incentive of the startup to enter as a duopolist (Gilbert and Newberry, 1982) . This "preemption e¤ect" is at odds with the replacement e¤ect. There are other forces that may favor incumbents as well-lower R&D costs or an existing stock of R&D capital. 2 Whether the balance of all these forces favors incumbents or startups is then an empirical question. In a recent paper, Igami (2017) went back to the disk-drive industry and constructed a structural model to try to answer this question. A large fraction of …rms failed to make the transition from 5:25-to 3:5-inch drives. Igami found evidence that Arrow's replacement e¤ect played a substantial role, explaining about 60% of the turnover.
In this paper, we study a continuous-time, winner-take-all R&D race between an established …rm and a startup in which we identify an entirely new e¤ect that works to the detriment of the established …rm-a "curse of information." Incumbent …rms have more experience and so have better information about the likelihood of success of the new innovation. The …rms are alike in all other respects and so the replacement and preemption e¤ects are absent. Formally, there are two states of nature. In one, the innovation is feasible and R&D brings success stochastically-in the manner of exponential bandits. In the other state, the innovation is not feasible. Firms do not know the state but receive informative private signals about it and the established …rm's signal is more accurate than that of the startup. A good signal makes a …rm optimistic and a bad one pessimistic. As the race proceeds, lack of success causes both …rms to become increasingly pessimistic about the feasibility of the innovation. R&D is costly and each …rm must then decide when to quit, a decision is observed by its rival and is irrevocable.
Our main result is Theorem 1 There is an equilibrium of the R&D game in which the less-informed startup wins more often, and has a higher payo¤, than the better-informed incumbent. Moreover, if the quality of the incumbent's information is much better than that of the startup, then this is the only equilibrium.
Our result shows that in an otherwise symmetric situation, the incumbent's informational advantage becomes a competitive disadvantage-it wins the R&D race less often than the startup and, as we will see, has a lower payo¤ as well. The startup is favored to win precisely because it is less informed! We call such an equilibrium an "upstart equilibrium." In such an equilibrium, the less-informed startup is, quite naturally, willing to learn from the incumbent. But because of its superior information, the incumbent is unwilling to learn from the startup/upstart. This unbalanced learning is why the startup wins more often and the better information available to the established …rm becomes a curse.
Precisely, both the incumbent and the startup play strategies that reveal over time whether or not they are optimistic. But since the incumbent's information is of higher quality than that of the startup, when pessimistic it exits early in the race based solely on its own information. The reason is that while the startup also reveals its signal during the play of the game, this comes too late to make it worthwhile for a pessimistic incumbent to stay and learn. On the other hand, the information does not come too late for the optimistic incumbent for whom it is worthwhile to stay and learn the startup's signal. Thus a pessimistic incumbent exits early while an optimistic one stays. This means that the startup can learn the incumbent's information at low cost. During the play of the game, both the optimistic and the pessimistic startup learn the incumbent's information but only the optimistic incumbent learns the startup's information.
It is then not too hard to argue that if both …rms are optimistic or both are pessimistic, they exit at the same time. The same is true when the incumbent is optimistic and the startup pessimistic-this is because they both learn each other's signal. The remaining case is one with a pessimistic incumbent and an optimistic startup. The incumbent exits early and so the startup learns that it is pessimistic. But its own optimism causes the startup to continue with R&D nevertheless. Now the startup has a greater chance of winning than does the incumbent.
The upstart equilibrium outcome has some salient features. While it can be supported as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, it does not rely on any particular choice of o¤-equilibrium beliefs. More important, when the informational advantage of the incumbent is large, it is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome. The formal argument relies on the iterated elimination of dominated strategies-in our game, this procedure leaves a single outcome. Some idea of the reasoning can be gauged by noting that in these circumstances there cannot be a "mirror equilibrium" in which the roles of the two …rms are reversed and the incumbent learns more from the startup than the other way around. Because the startup's information is of very poor quality, it is not worthwhile for the incumbent to invest in learning this. So when the startup's information is very poor, a mirror equilibrium does not exist. In our formal analysis, we rule out not only the mirror equilibrium but all others as well.
In our equilibrium, a …rm may su¤er from ex post regret-had it known the other's signal, it may have wanted to stay longer in the race or may have wanted to exit earlier. 3 In equilibrium, the established …rm never regrets staying too long but may regret exiting too early. The startup, on the other hand, never regrets exiting too early but may regret staying too long.
Intuition suggests that information should confer a strategic advantage. In our model, it is a disadvantage. One might rightly wonder whether this is because in the game we study, the value of information is negative. 4 This is not the case. We show below that in the upstart equilibrium, the value of information is positive for both …rms. In other words, neither …rm can increase its equilibrium payo¤ by decreasing the quality of its own information. Theorem 1 above is a comparison of payo¤s across …rms and does not contradict the fact that each …rm has the individual incentive to become better informed. Finally, we also ask whether it might be in the incumbent …rm's interest to decrease the quality of its information so drastically that it is completely uninformed. We show that such "willful ignorance" cannot be pro…table.
Overcon…dence The popular press is full of stories of brash Silicon Valley entrepreneurs who embark on risky projects that established …rms deem unworthy. Most of these startups fail but some do succeed and perhaps lead to the kinds of disruption that is observed. Some studies have argued that this over-investment in risky projects stems not from risk-loving preferences but rather from overcon…dence. 5 As one observer of the startup phenomenon has written: "In the delusions of entrepreneurs are the seeds of technological progress." (Surowiecki, 2014) In this view, the Elon Musks of the world drive innovation because of unwarranted self-con…dence. They remain optimistic in environments that the GMs of the world are pessimistic about, and perhaps realistically so.
While our model and analysis has no behavioral or psychological elements, it can be seen as providing a rational reinterpretation of such behavior. When the incumbent …rm's information is not favorable to the project while the startup's is, the former is pessimistic and the latter optimistic. The startup invests in R&D while the better-informed incumbent does not. In these circumstances, the rational optimism of the startup would be observationally equivalent to overcon…dence. In single-person problems, Benoît and Dubra (2011) argued that in many situations a fully rational Bayesian agent may end up with beliefs that, to an outside observer, would seem overcon…dent. They showed that this "apparent overcon…dence" could be generated solely by the structure of information available to the agent. Our model and equilibrium can be interpreted as doing the same, but now in a strategic situation with more than one agent. The postulated information structure and the upstart equilibrium results in behavior that an outside observer may well attribute to overcon…dence.
Related literature The basic model of this paper is rather standard. R&D races where the arrival times of success are exponentially distributed and there is uncertainty about the arrival rates were …rst studied by Choi (1991) . Malueg and Tsutsui (1997) extend Choi's model to allow for ‡exibility in the intensity of R&D. In a variant of Choi's model, Wong (2018) examines the consequences of imperfect patent protection thereby relaxing the winner-take-all structure common to most of the literature. 6 Chatterjee and Evans (2004) introduce another kind of uncertainty-there are two alternative paths to success and it is not known which is the correct one. Firms may switch from one path to another based on their beliefs. Das and Klein (2018) study a similar model and show that there is a unique Markov perfect equilibrium which is e¢ cient when …rms are symmetric in R&D ability and not otherwise.
In all of these models, however, there is no asymmetry of information-…rms' equilibrium beliefs are identical. In our model, …rms receive private signals prior to the race and the resulting asymmetry of beliefs is the key to our results.
The model of Moscarini and Squintani (2010) is, in its basic structure, most closely related to ours. These authors study a very general set-up with arbitrary distributions of arrival times (not necessarily exponential), continuous signals and di¤ering costs and bene…ts of R&D. They show the possibility that the exit of one …rm leads the other to regret staying as long-the …rm su¤ers from a "survivor's curse"-and so it also exits as soon as possible. 7 Our model di¤ers from that of Moscarini and Squintani in that we have discrete states and signals. At the same time, it specializes their model by assuming exponentially distributed arrival times, identical costs and bene…ts of R&D and comparable information. Moscarini and Squintani also point to a "quitter's curse"-regret at exiting too early. When the …rms' information is comparable, as we assume, even the curses are asymmetrically distributed. The better-informed …rm never su¤ers from the survivor's curse but may su¤er from the quitter's curse. The opposite is true for the less-informed …rm. Finally, we derive circumstances in which there is a unique equilibrium outcome and these too depend on the relative quality of the …rms'information. R&D race models are cousins of strategic experimentation problems, especially those with exponential bandits as in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) . Unlike the R&D models, the latter are not winner-take-all as one person's success does not preclude the other's. Also, in these models it is possible to switch back and forth between the risky and safe arms, unlike the irrevocable exit assumption in R&D race models. While most of these models were studied under symmetric information, in recent work, Dong (2018) has studied a variant with asymmetric and comparable information-one person has a private signal but the other is completely uninformed. 8 She …nds that this asymmetry induces more experimentation than if the situation were symmetric.
R&D race models also share important features with wars of attrition-in particular, the winner-take-all and irrevocable exit assumptions. There is, of course, a vast literature on wars of attrition with and without incomplete information. A related paper in this vein is by Chen and Ishida (2017) , who study a model which combines elements from strategic experimentation with wars of attrition. As in strategic experimentation models, one …rm's successful innovation does not preclude successful innovation by the other …rm. As in the war of attrition, exit by one …rm ends the game. Firms are asymmetric in how e¢ cient they are at R&D. There is a mixed strategy equilibrium and Chen and Ishida (2017) exhibit the possibility that the less e¢ cient …rm may win more often.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model of an R&D race is outlined in the next section. Section 3 studies, as a benchmark, the case of a single …rm without competition. There is no surprise here-if alone, the better informed …rm is more likely to succeed than the less informed …rm. In Section 4, we study the case of two competing …rms and exhibit the upstart equilibrium mentioned above. Section 5 then shows that this equilibrium is unique when the asymmetry in the quality of information is large. Equilibrium behavior is compared to the joint-pro…t maximizing solution in the next section. In Section 7, we show that despite the fact that in equilibrium the less informed …rm wins more often, the value of information is US and UK followed. 8 Klein and Wagner (2018) study a bandit problem where the quality of information of the players is the same. positive for both …rms. Finally, in Section 8 we show that the main result generalizes when the …rms may get more than two signals and so have …ner information. An appendix considers the special case when there is no asymmetric information and the …rms hold common beliefs throughout.
Preliminaries
Two …rms compete in an R&D race to produce an innovation. Time runs continuously, the horizon is in…nite and the interest rate is r > 0. The …rm that succeeds …rst will obtain a patent that yields ‡ow monopoly pro…ts of m forever after. Each …rm decides on how long it wants to actively participate in the race, if at all, and must incur a ‡ow cost of c while it is active. A …rm only chooses whether or not to be active, and not its intensity of R&D. Once a …rm quits, it cannot rejoin the race. Also, if a …rm quits at time t; say, then this is immediately observed by the other …rm. 9 The game ends either if one of the …rms succeeds or once both …rms quit.
Whether or not the innovation is worth pursuing is uncertain, however, and depends on an unknown state of nature that may be G ("good") or B ("bad") with prior probabilities and 1 , respectively. In state B; the innovation is not technologically feasible and all R&D activity is futile. In state G; it is feasible and success arrives at a Poisson rate > 0 per instant, independently for each …rm provided, of course, that the …rm is still active. This means that the distribution of arrival times of success is exponential, that is, the probability that in state G a …rm will succeed before time t is 1 e t : The two …rms are alike in all respects but one-…rm 1 (the "incumbent" or established …rm) is better informed about the state of nature, G or B, than is …rm 2 (the "startup" or entrant …rm). Speci…cally, before the race starts, each …rm i receives a noisy private signal s i 2 fg i ; b i g about the state. Conditional on the state, the signals of the two …rms are independent and
We will refer to q i as the quality of i's signal or information. 10 Throughout, we will assume that …rm 1's signal is of higher quality than that of …rm 2 in the sense that q 1 > q 2 and so …rm 1 is better informed.
Denote by p (s i ) the posterior probability that the state is G conditional on the signal s i ; that is,
This could happen with a delay > 0 so that if a …rm quits at time t; the other …rm learns of this only at time t + : We have chosen to set = 0 to simplify the exposition but our analysis is robust to the case when is small (details are available from the authors). 10 The assumption that Pr [g i j G] = Pr [b i j B] is made only for simplicity. It would be enough to assume that …rm 1's signals were more informative than …rm 2's signals in the sense of Blackwell. and similarly, denote by p (s 1 ; s 2 ) the posterior probability that the state is G conditional on the signals (s 1 ; s 2 ), that is,
It is easy to see that since …rm 1's signal is more accurate than …rm 2's signal, that is,
It is useful to de…ne p to be such that if a …rm believes that the probability that the state is G is p ; then the ‡ow expected gain is the same as the ‡ow cost. Thus, p is de…ned by p |{z} success rate m r |{z} gain = c |{z} cost and so
and we will suppose that 0 < p < 1:
We will assume that …rm 1's information is accurate enough so that if it is the only …rm, with signal b 1 it would not want to engage in R&D while with signal g 1 it would.
Assumption 1 The quality of …rm 1's is such that
Assumption 1 is made solely to allow a sharper statements of our results and to make the consideration of many trivial cases unnecessary. Without it, many of our results would involve only weak inequalities which would become strict if the condition above were to hold.
The following de…nition will prove useful in the subsequent analysis. Suppose both …rms have a common belief at time 0 that the probability of state G is p 0 and with this belief both engage in R&D at time 0: As time elapses and both …rms are active but neither …rm has been successful, the …rms become increasingly pessimistic that the state is G and the posterior probability that the state is G decreases. At time t; the common belief p t is such that
11 This is just Bayes'rule in terms of odds ratios: given any event E; we have
since, conditional on the state being G; the probability that neither …rm has been successful until time t is e 2 t .
De…nition 1 If the initial belief p 0 > p ; T (p 0 ) is the time when, absent any success by either …rm, this belief will decay to p ; that is,
If the initial belief p 0 p ; then T (p 0 ) = 0:
Equivalently, for p 0 > p ;
To save on notation, we will write
and
3 Single-…rm benchmark Before studying the situation in which the two …rms are competing against one another, it is useful to consider the case where each …rm acts in isolation. Comparing the situation in which …rm 1 is alone to the situation in which …rm 2 is alone, we obtain Proposition 0 The probability that …rm 1 is successful when alone is greater than the probability that …rm 2 is successful when alone.
To establish the proposition, …rst note that if …rm i gets a signal s i 2 fg i ; b i g ; then its belief that the state is G is p (s i ) at time 0: If p (s i ) p then the …rm should not engage in R&D at all since its expected pro…ts from R&D are non-positive. But if p (s i ) > p then it is worthwhile to engage in R&D at time 0 and continue to do so as long as its belief p t (s i ) at time t remains above p : In terms of odds ratios, this means that a solitary …rm should remain active as long as
re ‡ecting the fact that the probability that a single …rm does not succeed until time t is just e t . The following result is immediate.
Figure 1: Belief Decay
When two …rms are active, beliefs decay twice as fast (lower curve) as with one …rm (upper curve).
Lemma 3.1 A single …rm with signal s i should quit at the earliest time t such that
Proof. If …rm i with signal s i quits at time t i ; its ‡ow pro…t is
is the probability that there has been no success until time t: Recall that p = rc= m: The result obviously follows.
The optimal quitting time for a …rm with signal s i is just 2T (s i ) since from the de…nition of T in (3) and (4),
Since the beliefs of a single …rm decay at one-half the rate of decay with two …rms-two failures constitute worse news than one failure-it takes twice as long to reach p ; as depicted in Figure 1 . Since 2T (s i ) is the single-…rm optimal quitting time, using (6), the probability of success given the initial belief p (s i ) is
the …rm would enter regardless of its signal and its ex ante probability of success is
the …rm would enter only if its signal were g i and now the ex ante probability of success is
The proof of Proposition 0 is divided into two cases.
Now …rm 1 would enter only with a good signal whereas …rm 2 would enter regardless of its signal. Thus,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 1.
In this case, both …rms would enter only if they had good signals and some routine calculations show that the di¤erence in success probabilities
This completes the proof of Proposition 0.
Upstart equilibrium
In this section, we exhibit an equilibrium of the R&D game in which the established …rm enters the race if and only if it receives a favorable signal whereas the startup enters the race regardless of its signal. In this equilibrium, the probability that the startup wins the race is greater than or equal to the probability that the established …rm wins and is strictly greater whenever p (b 1 ; g 2 ) > p .
In the next section, we will show that when the established …rm 1 is much better informed than the startup …rm 2; this is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome.
Recall from (3) and (5) 
and if p (
The ranking of the posterior probabilities (see (1)) implies
and the inequalities are strict unless both sides are 0:
Consider following "upstart outcome" depicted in Figure 2 . When the signals are (b 1 ; b 2 ) ; …rm 1 does not enter and …rm 2 exits immediately upon entering and learning that 1 did not enter. When the signals are (g 1 ; g 2 ) ; both …rms exit simultaneously at time T (g 1 ; g 2 ) : When the signals are (g 1 ; b 2 ) ; …rm 2 exits at time T (g 1 ; b 2 ) and upon learning this, …rm 1 follows immediately. Finally, when the signals are (b 1 ; g 2 ) ; …rm 1 does not enter and …rm 2 stays until 2T (b 1 ; g 2 ) :
In the …rst three cases the chance that …rm 1 will win is the same as the chance that …rm 2 will win. But in the last case, …rm 1 does not enter and when T (b 1 ; g 2 ) > 0; …rm 2 has a positive probability of winning. Thus, ex ante …rm 2 has a greater chance of obtaining the patent than does …rm 1-the startup is an upstart. We will …rst establish Proposition 1 There exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the less-informed …rm 2 wins more often than the better-informed …rm 1.
Strategies A strategy for …rm i is a pair of functions ( i ; i ) where i :
First, i (s i ) is the time at which …rm i with signal s i decides to quit unilaterallythat is, if he or she has not received any information that the other …rm has quit. If i (s i ) = 1; this means that the …rm decides to never quit unilaterally. Second, i (s i ; t j ) is the time at which …rm i with signal s i quits after learning that the other …rm quit at time t j : Of course, i (s i ; t j ) t j :
We have only de…ned pure strategies here as the equilibrium we construct below does not involve any randomization. When we show that the equilibrium outcome is unique, we will introduce and consider randomized strategies as well.
Firm 1 (top) enters only with signal g 1 and then if …rm 2 exits at T (g 1 ; b 2 ), follows immediately, depicted as a U-turn. Otherwise, it stays until T (g 1 ; g 2 ). Firm 2 (bottom) enters with either b 2 or g 2 . If …rm 1 exits at 0, …rm 2 with signal b 2 follows immeditiately and with g 2 , exits at 2T (b 1 ; g 2 ).
Otherwise, …rm 2 with b 2 exits at T (g 1 ; b 2 ) and with g 2 , exits at T (g 1 ; g 2 ).
Equilibrium strategies
Consider the following strategies:
with the following beliefs about its rival. If t 2 T (g 1 ; b 2 ) ; then …rm 1 believes that s 2 = b 2 and otherwise believes s 2 = g 2 :
with the following beliefs about its rival. If t 1 = 0; then …rm 2 believes that s 1 = b 1 and otherwise believes s 1 = g 1 :
Veri…cation of equilibrium
We now verify that the strategies ( i ; i ) speci…ed above constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To do this we will ascertain the optimal quitting time for the two …rms in various situations. This quitting time will, as in Lemma 3.1, be determined by the condition that a …rm's belief that the state is G is equal to p : But when another …rm j is present, …rm i not only knows its own signal s i but may learn …rm j's signal s j in the course of play. Thus, it may be the case that even if based on its own signal alone, the belief is below p ; the possibility of learning s j in the future is a worthwhile investment. The following analog of Lemma 3.1 is derived under the condition that all such learning has already taken place. Thus we have
where p it is …rm i's belief at time t given all the information it has and Pr [S 0 (t)] is the probability that there has been no success until time t: This is the payo¤ because the chance that both …rms will succeed at the same instant is zero. Note that …rm j's quitting time t j a¤ects the instantaneous payo¤ only through its e¤ect on i's belief p it -before t j the belief p it declines rapidly since there are two unsuccessful …rms whereas after j quits at time t j the belief declines slowly since there is only one unsuccessful …rm.
Firm 1 Suppose …rm 2 follows the strategy ( 2 ; 2 ) speci…ed above.
Firm 1 with signal g 1 : We …rst argue that 1 (g 1 ) < T (g 1 ; b 2 ) cannot be a best response. This is because 2 (b 2 ) = T (g 1 ; b 2 ) < T (g 1 ; g 2 ) = 2 (g 2 ) and if g 1 exits before T (g 1 ; b 2 ) ; it cannot learn 2's signal and the only information it has until then is g 1 : But the posterior probability of G conditional on g 1 alone is p (g 1
On the other hand, if 1 (g 1 ) T (g 1 ; b 2 ) ; there are two possibilities. Given 2 ; either g 1 learns at time T (g 1 ; b 2 ) that …rm 2 quit and then infers that s 2 = b 2 or g 1 learns that …rm 2 did not quit and then infers that s 2 = g 2 : If g 1 learns that 2 quit, then it should also quit as soon as possible, that is, at T (g 1 ; b 2 ) (Lemma 4.1 again). Thus, 1 (g 1 ; T (g 1 ; b 2 )) is optimal. If g 1 learns that 2 did not quit, then since 2 (g 2 ) = T (g 1 ; g 2 ) ; …rm 1 should exit at T (g 1 ; g 2 ) as well, that is, 1 (g 1 ) is optimal. It is obvious that …rm 1's beliefs about s 2 are consistent with …rm 2's equilibrium behavior.
By the same reasoning, 1 (g 1 ; t 2 ) is optimal for all t 2 6 = T (g 1 ; b 2 ) given 1's (o¤-equilibrium) beliefs.
Firm
Firm 2 with signal g 2 : Since 1 (g 1 ) = T (g 1 ; g 2 ) and 1 (b 1 ) = 0; if …rm 2 enters, it will learn whether 1's signal is b 1 or g 1 . If it learns that s 1 = b 1 ; then its optimal response is 2 (g 2 ; 0) = 2T (b 1 ; g 2 ). On the other hand, if it learns that s 1 = g 1 ; then by Lemma 4.1 …rm 2 should quit at 2 (g 2 ) = T (g 1 ; g 2 ) :
By the same reasoning, 2 (g 2 ; t 1 ) is optimal for all t 1 < T (g 1 ; g 2 ) given 2's (o¤-equilibrium) beliefs.
Firm 2 with signal b 2 : The same reasoning as in the case where …rm 2's signal was g 2 shows that again 2's strategy is a best response.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
The particular choice of o¤-equilibrium beliefs does not a¤ect the equilibrium outcome-any beliefs will do. O¤-equilibrium beliefs could a¤ect a …rm's pro…t only if a deviation to stay longer than expected would cause its rival to drop out earlier.
For instance, the equilibrium speci…es that …rm 1 with signal b 1 should not enter. If it did, then …rm 2 would have to assign probability 1 to s 1 = g 1 ; since this is the only belief consistent with the equilibrium path. Thus, by entering b 1 cannot get …rm 2 to exit early. In the upstart equilibrium outcome, all such events occur on the equilibrium path.
Equilibrium payo¤s
The expected ‡ow pro…ts of …rm 1 in the upstart equilibrium are
Figure 3: Upstart Equilibrium Payo¤s
An upstart equilibrium exists in the quadrilateral region enclosed by dark lines. Above the curve, …rm 2's equilibrium payo¤ (and winning probability) is strictly greater than that of …rm 1. Below the curve, they are equal.
where v (p 0 ) is the ‡ow payo¤ to a …rm when both …rms have a common belief p 0 at time 0 that the state is G (see Appendix A). The expression for the equilibrium payo¤ results from the fact that when the signals are (g 1 ; g 2 ) or (g 1 ; b 2 ) ; these become commonly known in the course of play of the upstart equilibrium. When the signals are (b 1 ; g 2 ) or (b 1 ; b 2 ) ; …rm 1 does not enter the race and so its payo¤ is zero. The expected pro…ts of …rm 2 in the upstart equilibrium are
As long as p (b 1 ; g 2 ) > p ;
2 > 1 These facts are depicted in Figure 3 and we summarize these …ndings as, Corollary 1 In the upstart equilibrium, the less-informed …rm 2's payo¤ is greater than the better-informed …rm 1's payo¤.
Uniqueness
We now show that when the informational advantage of …rm 1 is large, that is, …xing all other parameters, q 2 is small relative to q 1 , then the upstart equilibrium outcome is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 2 When the established …rm's informational advantage is large, there is a unique Nash equilibrium outcome. Precisely, for every q 1 there exists a q 2 such that for all q 2 < q 2 ; there is a unique Nash equilibrium outcome.
The proof of the Proposition is in two steps. First, we show that iterated elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS) results in a single outcome. Here we will use one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies, followed by multiple (actually six more!) rounds of (iteratively) weakly/strictly dominated strategies. 12 The resulting outcome will be the same as in ( ; ) : As a …nal step, we will show that there cannot be any other Nash equilibrium outcome-the weakly dominated strategies that were eliminated cannot be part of any Nash equilibrium.
Step 1
Denote by the original game and by (n) the game after n rounds of elimination. In what follows, Lemma 4.1 will invoked repeatedly in the following manner: if the two signals are known to be (s 1 ; s 2 ) ; then a …rm that exits at t < T (s 1 ; s 2 ) would leave some money on the table since that …rm's belief time t; p it > p :
IEDS Round 1
Claim 1 (a) Any strategy of …rm 1 such that 1 (g 1 ) < T (g 1 ; b 2 ) is weakly dominated in :
Unique Eqm.
Figure 4: Uniqueness
There is a unique equilibrium outcome below the upper curve. Between the two curves, the startup has strictly higher payo¤s in the unique equilibrium outcome.
Proof. Quitting at 1 (g 1 ) < T (g 1 ; b 2 ) is weakly dominated by quitting at 1 (
is strictly worse for g 1 than quitting at
Claim 1 (b) Any strategy of …rm 2 such that 2 (g 2 ) < T (b 1 ; g 2 ) is weakly dominated in .
Proof. The proof is the same as in the previous claim with the identities the …rms interchanged.
It is important to note that in this round the strategies eliminated are not strictly dominated. The reason is that a strategy ( 1 ; 1 ) that calls on …rm 1 with signal g 1 to quit at a time such that 0 < 1 (g 1 ) < T (g 1 ; b 2 ) is not strictly worse than quitting at T (g 1 ; b 2 ) against a strategy ( 2 ; 2 ) such that 2 (b 2 ) = 0 = 2 (g 2 ) : Since both types of …rm 2 quit at time 0, the choice of 1 (g 1 ) is irrelevant. More generally, such a 1 (g 1 ) is not strictly worse than T (g 1 ; b 2 ) against any strategy ( 2 ; 2 ) such that max ( 2 (b 2 ) ; 2 (g 2 )) < 1 (g 1 ) :
IEDS Round 2
Claim 2 Any strategy of …rm 1 such that 1 (b 1 ) > T (b 1 ; g 2 ) is strictly dominated in (1) :
In this case, for …rm 1 to choose 1 (b 1 ) > T (b 1 ; g 2 ) is strictly worse than 1 (b 1 ) = T (b 1 ; g 2 ). On the other hand, if …rm 2's signal is b 2 ; then for …rm 1 to choose 1 (b 1 ) > T (b 1 ; g 2 ) is no better than 1 (b 1 ) = T (b 1 ; g 2 ). Thus, the expected payo¤ from 1 (b 1 ) > T (b 1 ; g 2 ) is strictly lower than the expected payo¤ from quitting at T (b 1 ; g 2 ).
IEDS Round 3
Claim 3 Given all other parameters, there exists a q 2 such that for all q 2 < q 2 , any strategy of …rm 2 such that (i) if
Proof. (i) Claim 1 (a) and Claim 2 imply that
This means that …rm 2 can learn …rm 1's signal by staying until 1 (b 1 ) :
We will now argue that ( 2 ; 2 ) is strictly dominated by
Since b 1 will exit no later than T (b 1 ; g 2 ) ; …rm 2's ‡ow pro…t from the strategy ( 2 ; 2 ) when evaluated at any time
where S 0 (t) is the event that neither …rm has succeed until t and …rm 2's belief at time t that the state is G is
Before time T (b 1 ; g 2 ), …rm 2 cannot learn 1's signal and so its belief p 2t results only from its own signal b 2 : At time T (b 1 ; g 2 ) it learns 1's signal and exits immediately if s 1 = b 1 : But if …rm 1 does not exit at T (b 1 ; g 2 ) ; then …rm 2 knows that s 1 = g 1 and its belief now results from both its own signal b 2 and …rm 1's signal g 1 : Notice that while the …rst term in the expression for …rm 2's payo¤ above may be negative, the second is surely positive. For q 2 small enough so that p (b 1 ; g 2 ) p ; or equivalently, T (b 1 ; g 2 ) = 0; the …rst term is zero while the second is strictly positive when p (g 1 ; b 2 ) > p and so T (g 1 ; b 2 ) > 0 as well. Thus, there exists a q 2 such that for all q 2 < q 2 ; the payo¤ from ( 2 ; 2 ) is greater than the payo¤ from any strategy such that 2 (b 2 ) < T (b 1 ; g 2 ) :
If
Since the latter occurs with positive probability, ( 2 ; 2 ) is strictly better.
(ii) Obvious since in this case p (g 1 ; b 2 ) p :
In the rest of the proof, we will assume that q 2 < q 2 : Note that q 2 depends on the other parameters, in particular on q 1 :
IEDS Round 4
Claim 4 Any strategy of …rm 1 such that 1 (b 1 ) > 0, is strictly dominated in (3).
Proof. From Claim 1 (b) and Claim 3 we know that …rm 2; regardless of its signal, will not be the …rst to quit before T (b 1 ; g 2 ) : This means that …rm 1 will learn nothing from …rm 2 prior to T (b 1 ; g 2 ) : This implies that if …rm 1 with signal b 1 enters and exits before T (b 1 ; g 2 ), its payo¤ is negative (recall that it is not worthwhile for …rm 1 to enter just with his own signal b 1 ). If …rm 1 enters, stays until T (b 1 ; g 2 ) or longer, the best event is that it learns that …rm 2's signal is g 2 at exactly time T (b 1 ; g 2 ), the earliest time that he could learn anything about …rm 2's signal. But even in this case, it is best to exit immediately after learning …rm 2's signal. Thus, even if …rm 1 were to learn that …rm 2's signal was g 2 ; it cannot make any use of this information. Then, as before, his payo¤ from entering is negative.
IEDS Round 5
Claim 5 (a) Any strategy of …rm 2 such that 2 (g 2 ; 0) 6 = 2T (b 1 ; g 2 ) is strictly dominated in (4) :
Proof. Given all previous rounds, we know that …rm 1 will enter with g 1 and not with b 1 : Thus, if …rm 2 sees at time 0 that …rm 1 did not enter, it knows that 1's signal was b 1 : If …rm 2's signal is g 2 , it is strictly dominated to quit at a time other than 2T (b 1 ; g 2 ) :
Claim 5 (b) Any strategy of …rm 2 such that 2 (b 2 ; 0) 6 = 0 is strictly dominated in (4) :
Proof. Given all previous rounds, we know that …rm 1 will enter with g 1 and not with b 1 : Thus, if …rm 2 sees at time 0 that …rm 1 did not enter, it knows that 1's signal was b 1 : Clearly, given that 2's own signal is b 2 ; staying is strictly dominated.
Claim 5 (c) Any strategy of …rm
Proof. Given all previous rounds, we know that …rm 1 will enter with g 1 and not with b 1 : Thus, if …rm 2 sees that …rm 1 entered, it knows that 1's signal is g 1 : From Claim 1(a), …rm 1 will stay at least until T (g 1 ; b 2 ) : For …rm 2 to quit at a time other than T (g 1 ; b 2 ) is strictly dominated.
Claim 5 (d) Any strategy of …rm 2 such that 2 (g 2 ) < T (g 1 ; g 2 ) is weakly dominated in (4) :
Proof. Given all previous rounds, we know that …rm 1 will enter with g 1 and not with b 1 : Thus, if …rm 2 sees that …rm 1 entered, it knows that 1's signal is g 1 :
is strictly worse than quitting at T (g 1 ; g 2 ) : If
; then all quitting times 2 (g 2 ) such that 1 (g 1 ) < 2 (g 2 ) result in the same payo¤ as quitting at T (g 1 ; g 2 ) : If 1 (g 1 ) < T (g 1 ; g 2 ) ; then all quitting times 2 (g 2 ) such that 2 (g 2 ) < 1 (g 1 ) results in a payo¤ strictly worse than from quitting at T (g 1 ; g 2 ) :
Note that for the same reasons as in Round 1; the strategies eliminated in Claim 5 (d) are also only weakly dominated.
IEDS Round 6
Claim 6 (a) Any strategy of …rm 1 such that 1 
Proof. Given all previous rounds, 2 (b 2 ) = T (g 1 ; b 2 ) < T (g 1 ; g 2 ) 2 (g 2 ) (Claim 5 (c) and Claim 5 (d)). So if …rm 2 quits at T (g 1 ; b 2 ) ; …rm 1 knows that 2's signal is b 2 : Then it is dominated for …rm 1 to continue after T (g 1 ; b 2 ).
Claim 6 (b) Any strategy of …rm 1 such that 1 (g 1 ) 6 = T (g 1 ; g 2 ) is strictly dominated in (5) :
Proof. As in the proof of the previous claim, if …rm 2 does not quit at T (g 1 ; b 2 ) ; …rm 1 knows that 2's signal is g 2 : From Claim 5(d), 2 (g 2 ) T (g 1 ; g 2 ) : Thus, it is dominated for …rm 1 to quit at any other time.
IEDS Round 7
Claim 7 Any strategy of …rm 2 such that 2 (g 2 ) > T (g 1 ; g 2 ) is strictly dominated in (6) :
Proof. If …rm 2 with signal g 2 sees that …rm 1 entered, it knows that 1's signal is g 1 : From Claim 6 (b), thus …rm 1 will quit at T (g 1 ; g 2 ) and so …rm 2 should also quit at that time.
Step 2
The iterated elimination of dominated strategies, weak and strict, carried out above leaves a single outcome-the same as that in the upstart equilibrium ( i ; i ) : We now argue that this outcome is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome in : Suppose that (e ; e ) is a (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium where e i (s i ) is a random variable on [0; 1) and so is e i (s i ; t j ) : It is clear that there is no point in randomizing once the other player has exited. Thus, we can write (e ; ) where is pure.
Claim 8
If (e ; ) is a Nash equilibrium, then Pr [e 2 (g 2 ) < T (b 1 ; g 2 )] = 0:
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that Pr [e 2 (g 2 ) < T (b 1 ; g 2 )] > 0. We will sub-divide this event into three cases.
In this case, with positive probability g 1 is the …rst to quit. But for g 1 , quitting at any time t 1 < T (b 1 ; g 2 ) is strictly worse than quitting at T (b 1 ; g 2 ) in expectation. Note that if s 2 = g 2 ; then quitting at t 1 is strictly worse than quitting at T (b 1 ; g 2 ) : This is because at any time t < T (b 1 ; g 2 ) < T (g 1 ; b 2 ) ; the belief of g 1 is such that p 1t > p (using Lemma 4.1). On the other hand, if s 2 = b 2 ; it is no better.
In this case, for g 2 ; quitting at any time t 2 < T (b 1 ; g 2 ) is strictly worse than quitting at T (b 1 ; g 2 ) in expectation.
Again, for g 2 ; quitting at any time t 2 < T (b 1 ; g 2 ) is strictly worse than quitting at T (b 1 ; g 2 ) in expectation.
Thus, we have argued that (e ; ) is not a Nash equilibrium.
Claim 9
If (e ; ) is a Nash equilibrium, then Pr [e 1 (g 1 ) < T (g 1 ; b 2 )] = 0:
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that Pr [e 1 (g 1 ) < T (g 1 ; b 2 )] > 0: Again we will sub-divide this event into three cases.
In this case, with positive probability g 1 is the …rst to quit since by Claim 8, g 2 never quits before T (b 1 ; g 2 ) : But for g 1 to quit at a time t 1 < T (g 1 ; b 2 ) is strictly worse than quitting at T (g 1 ; b 2 ) in expectation. This is because if s 2 = g 2 ; this is strictly worse because Pr [e 2 (g 2 ) T (b 1 ; g 2 )] = 1 (Claim 8) and if s 2 = b 2 ; it is no better. Thus, Pr [e 1 (g 1 ) T (b 1 ; g 2 )] = 0:
First, note that Pr [e 1 (b 1 ) > T (b 1 ; g 2 )] = 0 as well. This is because from Claim 8, Pr [e 2 (g 2 ) T (b 1 ; g 2 )] = 1 and so when the signals are (b 1 ; g 2 ) ; for b 1 to stay beyond T (b 1 ; g 2 ) is strictly worse than dropping out at T (b 1 ; g 2 ) : When the signals are (b 1 ; b 2 ) ; either dropping out at some t 1 > T (b 1 ; g 2 ) is suboptimal because t 2 t 1 or it does not matter because t 2 < t 1 : Thus to drop out at any
In this case, for g 1 to quit before T (g 1 ; b 2 ) is strictly worse than quitting at T (g 1 ; b 2 ) in expectation. This is because if s 2 = g 2 ; it is strictly worse and if s 2 = b 2 it is no better.
So far we have argued that if (e ; ) is a (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium then almost every pure action in its support was not weakly dominated in Round 1 of the IEDS procedure. We complete the proof by showing that the same is true in Round 5.
Claim 10
If (e ; ) is a Nash equilibrium, then Pr [e 2 (g 2 ) < T (g 1 ; g 2 )] = 0:
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that Pr [e 2 (g 2 ) < T (g 1 ; g 2 )] > 0: Again, we will sub-divide this event into two cases. This means that if …rm 1 is active at any time t > 0; then with probability 1, …rm 2 believes that s 1 = g 1 : Thus, it is not optimal for g 2 to quit before T (g 1 ; g 2 ) :
In this case, since Claim 8 implies Pr [e 2 (g 2 ) T (b 1 ; g 2 )] = 1 and Claim 5 (c) implies Pr [e 2 (b 2 ) = T (g 1 ; b 2 )] = 1; at any time t > T (g 1 ; b 2 ) …rm 1 will believe with probability 1 that s 2 = g 2 : Thus if Pr [e 1 (g 1 ) > T (g 1 ; b 2 )] > 0; then it is suboptimal for g 1 to quit before T (g 1 ; g 2 ) : If Pr [e 1 (g 1 ) = T (g 1 ; b 2 )] = 0; then it is better to stay a little longer and learn whether or not s 2 = g 2 :
The last claim shows that if (e ; ) is a Nash equilibrium, the probability that a pure strategy in the support of e 2 (g 2 ) is eliminated in Round 5 of the IEDS procedure is zero.
We have thus argued that no Nash equilibrium can have an outcome di¤erent from the one in ( ; ) :
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Multiplicity with near symmetry We have shown that when …rm 1's informational advantage is large, there is a unique equilibrium outcome. When this advantage is small, however, there may be other equilibria as well. To see this, suppose that q 1 q 2 is small. Now the argument for uniqueness no longer holds-in particular, the reasoning in Round 3 of the IEDS procedure fails. Indeed, when q 1 q 2 is small enough, there exists an equilibrium which is "mirror image" of the upstart equilibrium with the roles of …rms 1 and 2 interchanged.
In the mirror equilibrium, denoted by ( ; ) ; …rm 2 enters the race only if its signal is g 2 . Speci…cally, 2 (b 2 ) = 0 while 2 (g 2 ) = T (g 1 ; g 2 ) : Moreover,
Firm 1 enters the race regardless of its signal and
Here we have not speci…ed o¤-equilibrium behavior and beliefs but this can be done by mimicking the upstart equilibrium.
When q 1 q 2 is small, T (b 1 ; g 2 ) is close to T (g 1 ; b 2 ) : Moreover, the assumption that p (b 1 ) < p (Assumption 1) implies that p (b 2 ) < p as well. Now the arguments con…rming that ( ; ) is an equilibrium also con…rm that ( ; ) is also an equilibrium.
Conditional dominance
When q 2 is relatively small, the upstart outcome is not only the unique Nash equilibrium outcome but it is also the unique outcome remaining after iterated elimination of conditionally dominated strategies (Shimoji and Watson, 1998) .
A strategy for a player is conditionally dominated, if there is an information set for that player that (i) can be reached by the player's own strategy; (ii) is strictly dominated by another strategy when measured against only those strategies of other players which can reach the given player's information set. In the iterative procedure carried out above, the strategies that were eliminated in Round 1 and Round 5 were weakly dominated but not strictly dominated. These strategies were, however, conditionally dominated. Thus, the equilibrium outcome we identify is also the only outcome that survives iterated elimination of conditionally dominated strategies. 13 
Planner' s problem
How does the upstart equilibrium compare to the solution of a "planner" who seeks to maximize the joint expected pro…ts of the two …rms? To analyze such a planner's problem, suppose that the belief that the state is G is p 0 > p at time 0:
Since exit is irrevocable and it is never optimal to continue once the belief falls below p ; the planner's problem reduces to choosing a time S such that both …rms are active until S T T (p 0 ) and then one of the …rms exits. Since both …rms engage in R&D until time S; the belief decays at the rate 2 until S and then at the rate after that. Thus per-…rm expected ‡ow pro…t from switching from two …rms to one …rm at time S is
where the belief p t at time t that the state is G is de…ned by
re ‡ecting the fact that both …rms are active until time S and after that only one of the two …rms is active. Note that e 2 t p 0 + 1 p 0 is the probability that neither …rm is successful until time t: Note also that p 2T S = p and that the coe¢ cient 1 2 in the second term appears because w represents per-…rm ‡ow pro…ts and the pro…t of the …rm that exits is 0: After substituting for p t from (11), w (S) can be explicitly calculated to be 2 ( + r) = 0 whenever S < T: Thus, w is a concave function and w 0 (T ) = 0: As a result, the joint pro…ts of the …rms are maximized when S = T; that is, when both …rms are active until time T: Thus, we obtain Proposition 3 The joint pro…t-maximizing plan with any initial belief p 0 is for both …rms to invest in R&D as long as it is pro…table, that is, as long as the updated belief p t > p .
Relative to the planner's optimum, the upstart equilibrium results in strictly lower total pro…ts when p (b 1 ; g 2 ) > p ; otherwise, they are the same. It is worth noting, however, that the ex ante probability of R&D success in the upstart equilibrium versus the planner's optimum is always the same. To see this, recall that the only di¤erence between the two possibly occurs when the signals are (b 1 ; g 2 ) : In this case, …rm 1 stays out while …rm 2 invests until time 2T (b 1 ; g 2 ) : Conditional on (b 1 ; g 2 ) ; the probability of success in equilibrium is then
and this is the same as that in the planner's solution. Notice that while the overall probability of success in equilibrium is the same as that for the planner, success arrives later in the former case. This is because in equilibrium, when the signals are (b 1 ; g 2 ) only one …rm is investing in R&D. This causes "learning-from-failure" to slow down relative to the case when two …rms invest, which is the planner's solution. If we interpret the planner's problem as arising from a merger of the two …rms to form a monopoly and the equilibrium as arising from competition, then this says that a monopoly would reach R&D success faster than competition, perhaps echoing the sentiments expressed by Schumpeter (1942) .
Value of information
In the upstart equilibrium, the startup …rm 2 not only wins more often than …rm 1; it also obtains a higher equilibrium payo¤ (Corollary 1). This suggests perhaps that …rm 1, say, could be better o¤ with less precise information. This is not the case, however. We show next that despite the fact that the equilibrium payo¤ of the less-informed …rm is higher than that of the better-informed …rm, the value of information for both …rms is positive.
14 Proposition 4 Suppose q 1 > q 2 . Then in the upstart equilibrium, …rm 1's payo¤ is increasing in q 1 and …rm 2's payo¤ is increasing in q 2 :
First, consider …rm 1: Recall from (9) , that
Proof.
is an increasing and convex function that is non-negative and strictly positive for p > p and so
The sign of the right-hand side of the inequality is the same as the sign of
Proof. The proof is the same as that of the previous lemma with b 2 replaced by g 2 :
Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2 together imply that …rm 1's equilibrium payo¤ 1 is increasing in q 1 :
Next, consider …rm 2: From (10),
We will show that the sum of the …rst two terms is increasing in q 2 and the last term is increasing in q 2 as well.
Proof. Since Pr [g 1 ] is independent of q 2 ; it is su¢ cient to show that
is increasing in q 2 :
where p 0 (g 1 ; ) denotes the posterior derived from q 0 2 : Moreover, the mean p 0 (g 1 ; ) is p (g 1 ) and this is the same as the mean of p (g 1 ; ) (since the expectation of the posteriors is the prior). Thus, the distribution of p 0 (g 1 ; ) is a mean preserving spread of the distribution of p (g 1 ; ) .
Since v is a convex function, the result now follows.
Corollary 2 Suppose q 1 > q 2 . Then in the upstart equilibrium, …rm 1's payo¤ is increasing in q 2 :
Proof. In Appendix A it is also established that the single-…rm pro…t function u (p) is also increasing, convex and strictly positive if p > p and equal to zero if p p : Using similar arguments as in the case of …rm 1, establishes the result.
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
The fact that the value of information is positive for …rm 1 does not con ‡ict with the fact that its payo¤ is lower than that of …rm 2: The …rst is a statement about the derivative of 1 with respect to q 1 . The second is a statement comparing the pro…t levels of the two …rms.
Willful ignorance
Proposition 4 shows that …rm 1 cannot increase its equilibrium payo¤ by decreasing the quality of its information while still remaining better informed than …rm 2 (and assuming that the upstart equilibrium is played). Precisely, for all q 2 < q
where we have now explicitly indicated the dependence of the equilibrium pro…ts on the qualities of the two …rms'signals.
But could …rm 1 bene…t from a drastic decrease in the quality of its informationsay, by replacing all its experienced researchers, who have a good idea of the feasibility of the innovation, with new PhDs, who have none-thus becoming the less-informed …rm? In terms of the model, suppose we start from a situation in which (q 1 ; q 2 ) = (q 0 ; q 00 ) where ; q 00 so that …rm 1 is now less informed than …rm 2. In this situation, there is again a unique equilibrium, but this time it is …rm 1 which is the upstart. 15 This equilibrium is what we have called a "mirror equilibrium" (see the end of Section 5.2) since the roles of the …rms have been reversed. If we denote payo¤s in the mirror equilibrium by i ; by symmetry we have (see Figure 5 ). ; q 00 = 2 q 00 ;
But when the quality of …rm 2's information is 1 2 ; the upstart equilibrium outcome is unique and the expected pro…ts of the two …rms are the same, that is, 2 q 00 ;
But in the region where the quality of …rm 1's information is higher than that of …rm 2; 1 in increasing in both qualities (Proposition 4 and Corollary 2). Thus, ; q 00 = 1 q 00 ;
: This means that it is not a good idea for the informationally advantaged but competitively disadvantaged …rm 1 to become completely uninformed.
Of course, this argument applies not only to the case of complete ignorance, that is, q 1 = ; is such that p 00 (g 1 ; b 2 ) p the same argument applies (here p 00 (g 1 ; b 2 ) = Pr [G j g 1 ; b 2 ] computed using qualities q 1 and q 2 = q 00 ). This is because the argument above only relies on the equality, 2 (q 1 ; q 00 ) = 1 (q 1 ; q 00 ) : The message of this subsection is: Don't …re the experienced researchers. Willful ignorance does not pay!
Many signals
So far we have assumed that each …rm's information is binary-there are only two signals. In this section, we show that the main results are robust to the possibility that the …rms'information is …ner. Suppose that each of the two …rms receives one of a …nite number of signals, say, S 1 = x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x K and S 2 = y 1 ; y 2 ; :::; y L : As before, given the state, the signals are conditionally independent. We will assume that the signals can be ordered as x k < x k+1 and y l < y l+1 and that the monotone likelihood property is satis…ed, that is,
are strictly increasing in k and l, respectively. As in previous sections, we denote the posterior probabilities as p x k = Pr G j x k and p y l = Pr G j y l and so we have that the posterior probabilities p x k and p y l are strictly increasing in k and l; respectively, as well.
We will use the following terminology to describe …rm 2's signals. The monotone likelihood ratio property implies that low signals are pessimistic and high signals optimistic.
In what follows, the following de…nition will be useful.
De…nition 3
The quality bound on the information content of …rm 2's signals is
Note that since
it is the case Q 2 > 1. To see why this is a measure of information quality, observe that if the quality bound Q 2 is close to 1; then for all l; p y l = Pr G j y l is close to ; the prior probability-all the posteriors are close to the prior-and so …rm 2's signals are rather uninformative. Also, note that if there were only two signals and Pr [g 2 j G] = Pr [b 2 j B] = q 2 ; then Q 2 = q 2 = (1 q 2 ) :
Now observe that since
and we have assumed p x
when the quality bound on …rm 2's information, Q 2 ; is close enough to 1; we have p x k ; y 1 < ::: < p x k ; y L < p x k+1 ; y 1 < :::
In other words, …rm 2's signals are so poor that they cannot reverse the ranking of posteriors based on …rm 1's information alone. Finally, analogous to Assumption 1 in Section 2; we will assume that p x 1 < p < p x K that is, …rm 1's signals are accurate enough so that, when alone, sometimes it wants to enter and sometimes not.
Upstart equilibrium
We now demonstrate that, as in Section 4, that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the R&D race in which …rm 2 wins more often than …rm 1: Consider the following strategies. For …rm 1; with the o¤-equilibrium beliefs that if …rm 1 exits at a t 1 6 = T x k ; y L ; then its signal is x K : Figure 6 depicts such an equilibrium when L = 3. Notice that there are K stages and in stage k < K; …rm 2 with any signal can learn whether …rm 1's signal is x k or higher. Firm 2's information is revealed only in stage K and so only …rm 1 with highest signal, x K ; can learn …rm 2's signal. The learning is severely unbalanced. In equilibrium, …rm 1 never su¤ers from the "survivor's curse"-it never regrets staying too long-but may su¤er from the "quitter's curse"-it may regret exiting early. Firm 2; on the other hand, never su¤ers from the quitter's curse but may su¤er from the survivor's curse when its signal is pessimistic.
We then have Proposition 1 (M) There exists a Q 2 > 1 such that if 1 < Q 2 < Q 2 , then the strategies ( ; ) constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof. First, suppose that Q 2 > 1 is small enough so that (12) holds. This implies that the same ranking holds for T x k ; y l as well. Precisely, T x k ; y Proof. With common beliefs, a strategy for …rm i is a pair of functions ( i ; i ) as in the main text (now there are no private signals, however). Suppose the common initial belief is p 0 : It is easy to see that if …rm j chooses j = T (p 0 ) ; then it is a best response for …rm i 6 = j to choose i = T (p 0 ) as well.
To show uniqueness, …rst note that any ( i ; i ) such that i 6 = T (p 0 ) is weakly dominated by (T (p 0 ) ; i ) : Thus, the Nash equilibrium outcome above is the only outcome that survives one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies. The argument that there is no Nash equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies is the same as Step 2 in the proof of Proposition 2.
